Negotiations were still going on when a demand arose for a further expansion of the armed forces. This expansion was realised in the big increases in the army effected in the spring of The politicians who took the Ludendorff line and called 1 G. Ritter, op. The conservative elements in the Ministry of War, who argued the need for a qualitatively high cadre -and were anxious to preserve the aristocratic character of the officer corps- themselves cut down the number, so that the increase which the Chancellor asked the Reichstag to sanction in the spring of was only 1 17, rank and file and just under 19, officers and N.
This was the largest army estimate in German history. It was accepted by a majority composed of the right in the Reichstag. It took months of negotia- tion before the requisite expenditure, including over 1, million marks for non-recurrent items, could be voted, and it was finally accepted by a majority in which the centre of gravity had shifted left- ward and included the Social Democrats. The actual peace strength of the German army in 1 91 was thus , men, to which must be added 72, in the navy. In rela- tion to war the peacetime figures were less important than the fact that the German army, unlike the French, was able to put fully trained reserve formations into the field from the first day of war- there were 13 German reserve corps on the western front alone -and was thus numerically superior to the French, at least at the outset of war.
The peacetime strength of the Russian army, which had been under reorganisation with French financial help, had been 1 ,, since 1 , twice that of the German and , more than the German and Austrian together the Austrian figure was , Moreover, the Russian army had still not reached its full target of over 2 millions; this was to be attained only in In order to make sure, Wilhelm II had tried repeatedly, through dy- nastic channels, to secure from Belgium an assurance of her passivity, if not an alliance.
As early as the crisis the Emperor had asked Leopold II for an alliance and permission for German forces to march across Belgium, offering in return the restoration of the Duchy of Burgundy at the expense of France; Leopold had, however, re- fused. II, pp. King Albert made no concessions. The continuance of the conversations with London on colonial and Near Eastern questions was one of the means by which they hoped to achieve this end.
The negotiations, which opened in , ended on October 21, , with the initialling of a final draft of a revised agreement in the same form as that of , providing that the customs receipts from the colony of Mozambique south of latitude 16 and of Angola east of longitude 20 should be applied to the service of British loans to 1 Grosse Politik , Vols.
Britain further declared herself uninterested in the islands of S. Thome and Principe. As in , speculation on bankruptcy by Portugal was uncertain; moreover, the two powers in any case pledged one another to joint acting, which meant that the implica- tion of the agreement would depend on the state of Anglo-German relations. The British government, which was uninterested in the question and only carried on the negotiations pro forma in order to show the opposition that relations with Germany were not being neglected, wanted the new treaty abolished, together with the old treaty and the Treaty of Windsor; the German government was against this course, fearing with Jagow that the German public would feel that Germany had been over-reached.
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Stumm, then Head of the Political Section of the Foreign Ministry, pointed out Ger- many was not assured of her railway concession from Benguela in southern Angola to Katanga in the Belgian Congo because the part of Angola assigned by the treaty to Britain came between the part of Angola assigned to Germany and Katanga. Britain, for her part, found herself subjected to increasing remonstrations from France for having permitted Germany further access to the Congo basin without consulting Paris, and Grey consequently lost interest in seeing agreement reached.
After the negotiations over the Portuguese colonies, the Anglo- German conversations were chiefly concerned with attempts to reach i settlement in the Near East. The concession to extend the line to Baghdad was granted in , and in a supplementary agreement authorised the construction of a further line from Baghdad to a point on the Persian Gulf.
This extension touched the British zone of interest in Kuwait, and objections from Britain now added to those already coming from Russia against plotting the line so far north in Anatolia. On top of all this, British capital began in to take an inten- sive interest in the Mesopotamian oilfields. Up to German concessions confronted British capital. Sir Ernest Cassel then founded the National Bank of Turkey, the chief purpose of which was to estab- lish a concern uniting the two interests, and a new phase of the struggle for Turkish oil opened. After prolonged negotiations with the great oil companies, Cassel achieved his objective in in the shape of the Turkish Petrol Company.
The real political significance of this manoeuvre became apparent in Northampton, 1 On the general complex of questions see also W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy Cambridge, The Deutsche Bank was thus isolated. At the same time the extension of the Baghdad Railway became dependent on whether the British government which in had officially be- come a participant in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company gave its con- sent to an increase in the Turkish tariff duties, on which again the guarantee of the railway loans depended.
The credit for this agreement must go primarily to the German government. Germany gave way on this point, stipulating that Britain should pay for making the Shatt el Arab navigable, in order to allow the move- ment of goods from the terminus of the railway to the Persian Gulf ; in return a new British company, connected with the Indian Navi- gation Company, was founded, and was given the monopoly of ship- ping on the Tigris and the Euphrates. The agreement was highly advantageous to Britain, and Baffin, Director of the Ham- burg-America Line, protested against it, but vainly.
In these fields Ger- many was unmistakably willing to play the junior partner to Bri- tain as a world power. Berchtold accordingly immediately set about trying to get the dispositions laid down at Bucharest revised. Austria, in contradistinction to Germany, wanted to bring about the formation of a bloc consisting of Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary and Albania, which would force Serbia to come to terms with Austria. These latent tensions grew more acute when, as an effect of the Second Balkan War, the great powers began to increase their armies and to resume their rivalry for influence over the Balkan states and Turkey in the now familiar form of loans armament and other to governments, carrying with them orders for industries in the greater states.
In the autumn of Germany lost to France, which was able to mobilise massive capital resources in support of her political moves, much of the ground which she had acquired in the course of decades in Rumania, Greece, Serbia and Turkey. The danger became very real at the end of the year, when both Turkey and Austria-Hungary began looking round the western money-markets and enlisting En- tente capital for their policies. Disappointment over the situation in the Balkans and Turkey, the tension between Austria-Hungary and Serbia over the Southern Slav question in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and further tension between Austria-Hungary and Rumania, forced Austria and Germany apart.
Encircled by the Entente, Germany saw her isolation becoming more and more total. Wilhelm yielded. This event, however, was precisely what Germany hoped to avoid by stressing the German-Austrian alliance. The Emperor adjured Conrad: The others are not ready, they will do nothing to stop you.
You must be in Belgrade within a few days. I was always in favour of peace; but that has its limits. I have read a lot about war, and know what it means. But in the end situations arise in which a great power can no longer stand aside; it must grasp the sword. Here the Emperor was back on his old Near Eastern line, for he knew that Franz Ferdinand had op- posed, although vainly, the despatch of the ultimatum to Serbia on October Franz Ferdinand was against the policy of the military and the court party, the Hungarians and the clericals, and wanted to take the wind out of the sails of the Southern Slav movement by reforming the internal structure of the Monarchy, not by force.
Rumania and Greece. Serbia would then have to adhere willy-nilly. A few days later Wilhelm visited Berchtold in Vienna. Aussenpolitik , Vol. VII, No. Germany too had achieved her purpose: had passed without a world conflagration, the Triple Alliance seemed to have recovered its solidity, and the Emperor has not yet been forced to give up his hope of a league of the non-Slavonic peoples of the Bal- kans under German patronage. Thus in October and November, , Germany believed that she had re-attached Austria to herself quite firmly by her fortissimo protestations of Nibelung loyalty, and after the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest in the latter month, she fondly believed that she had secured Turkey, Rumania and Greece for allies.
Yet at the end of the year it became apparent that all the financial resources which she could muster were still insufficient to produce the loans which the Balkan states demanded as a kind of guarantee of their political and economic support. In Paris he had no recourse but to accept a French loan on the usual conditions, drawing a veil over his Berlin speeches, in which he had attributed the victories of the Greek troops to the training which they had received from German instructors. But this hope, too, proved unfounded.
Isolated, Germany had to retreat, and it was only with great difficulty that she succeeded in saving her face by getting Liman von Sanders appointed a Turkish field-marshal, with functions limited to those of military adviser. Kiibelwas sent to Turkey under orders from the general staff, issued without the knowledge of the Imperial Chancellor, the Foreign Office, or even the German ambassador in Constantinople, with the mission of adapting the Turkish railway system to the demands of war within six months.
The last bastion of German influence in Turkey was threatened. In fact Turkey received a large state loan from France in the spring of 19 In May, , while the German-Turkish military and financial negotiations were in progress, a sharp difference broke out between the most important German business groups interested in the Near 1 Hallgarten, Imp II. Krupp asked for a loan of million marks, to be raised on the Berlin market, for its armaments transactions.
Such a loan, however, would have overloaded the market with Turkish paper and have threatened the stability of Baghdad Railway stock. The grave disquiet with which the big banks, particularly the Deutsche Bank, were viewing the situation in the early summer of is reflected in a hand written note attached by Helfferich to a memorandum by the Deutsche Bank.
Not one man on our board can take the responsibility of going one step further with the advances for the construction of the Baghdad Railway without certain pros- pect that a Baghdad loan will come in the very near future. If the market is upset for us by Bulgarian or Turkish armaments loans we shall have to shut up shop. German imperialism found itself caught in a painful dilemma between the armaments deal, which had become essential to the overgrown heavy industry, and the railway deal, on which the prestige and the real influence of Germany in Turkey depended. The Foreign Ministry decided in favour of the Deutsche Bank.
On June 13, , just a fortnight before Sarajevo, Gwinner, the Chair- man of Directors of the Deutsche Bank, wrote to his Emperor : We felt obliged to undertake this sacrifice [sc. The Emperor, who had hesitated in and 1, himself thought that the moment had now arrived which, ever since , he had described as the critical point in Franco-German relations: he minuted a despatch on the threat of French competition in the Near East: Envy, envy, envy; everyone is envious of us. But the Gauls, in particular, must be taught quite plainly that they are not to presume that the Entente with Britain allows them to amuse themselves by trying to unseat us in the Near East.
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These are vital interests , the defence of which is all-important. I will fight for them , if need be. Whether, in spite of his big words, the Emperor would really fight if things became serious was doubted by many, not least by the army. Moltke agreed with him when the two men met on May 12, , for the last time before the outbreak of war. The soldier, unlike the Chancellor, held the possibility of a settlement with Britain to be illusory; he was convinced that if a major conflagration came, Bri- tain would side with France and Russia-as the emperor put it, that the Anglo-Saxons would side with the Gauls and the Slavs.
He regretted the attitude which had so often allowed the possibility of warlike action to pass unutilised, or had insisted on yielding. Bethmann Holl- weg, who in December, , had already rejected the suggestion passed on to him by the crown prince, and emanating from the pan- Germans, that a coup d'etat should be carried out against the Social Democrats, 4 spoke out again just six months later against these specu- 1 Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk , Vol.
I Wiesbaden, , p. Pogge and Geiss, op. He told Lerchenfield, the Bavarian minister, at the beginning of June, , that: There were still circles in the Reich which looked to war to bring about an improvement, in the conservative sense, of internal conditions in Germany. He thought that the effects would be the exact opposite; a world war, with its incalculable consequences, would greatly increase the power of Social Democracy, because it had preached peace, and would bring down many a throne.
The reactions were mixed in the Monarchy itself. For the July crisis see also the collection of documents edited by Imanuel Geiss, Julikrise und Kriegsaus- bruch , 2 vols. Hanover, Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, was more doubtful than Berchtold himself; the political situation was un- favourable, Russia too strong, public opinion unprepared. Both the German ambassador in Vienna, von Tschirschky, and Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry Jagow, his chief, was away on his honeymoon were at first very reserved and coun- selled moderation.
We must finish with the Serbs, quickly. From that hour Tschirschky and Zimmermann were among the most decided advocates of a hard policy towards Serbia. This reversal of attitude came as no surprise to Austria-Hungary. On July 1 the German publicist Victor Naumann, 4 a confidant of the German Foreign Ministry, had been in Vienna and had talked to Count Hojos, the permanent head of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry, to whom he had given an illuminating sketch of the mentality then prevailing in leading political circles of Germany.
Ludwig Bittner and Hans Uebersberger, Vol. Naumann openly counselled military action against Serbia. The Foreign Ministry, as he knew from von Stumm, would certainly not oppose it, and -the fourth favourable factor -the Emperor would not shrink from war, as he had in the Moroccan crises. More- over, public opinion would force the Foreign Ministry to let things take their course. The sooner Austria-Hungary struck, the bette r.
Count Hoyos was sent to Berlin to obtain this. Szogyeny handed the two documents to the Emperor the same day. Wilhelm even told the ambas- sador that if Vienna should decide on military action against Serbia, she ought to march at once. This was exactly what happened. Bethmann Hollweg and Zim- mermann were summoned to Potsdam the same afternoon, and to them the Emperor unfolded the same train of thought as he had to Szogyeny; 1 and, as Wilhelm expected, Bethmann Hollweg, who did not yet know the exact text of the Austrian memorandum, agreed completely with his imperial master.
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We in the general staff are ready ; there is nothing more for us to do at this juncture. II, After Sarajevo, 2nd ed. New York, , p. He did so in full awareness of the import of the assurances which he had given to Austria. Shortly after, when he was in the company of Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach with whom he was on terms of intimacy, he assured Krupp that: He would declare war at once, if Russia mobilised. The Chancellor left it to Austria to take die final decision but, like Wil- helm II, advised her to act at once, without informing Italy and Rumania; and like the Emperor, he justified his course by appeal to the favourable international situation.
Szogyeny had been prepared for this communication by the Emperor; Hoyos by Zimmermann, with whom he had talked on the 5th. All the participants except Tisza, who was still opposed to it, agreed on the necessity of war against Serbia, either by a direct attack without previous warning or by the presentation of an ultimatum with un- acceptable demands which would equally lead to war. That Germany faced the prospect of a general conflagration with open eyes emerges further from an in- struction drafted by Radowitz, a Counsellor in the Foreign Ministry, as early as July 7 and sent by Jagow to Lichnowsky in London on the 14th.
This epitomised German policy after the Hoyos mis- sion. II, p. Germany, he wrote, Emperor and Chancellor alike, were pressing most vig- orously for Austria to take immediate military action against Serbia. The other way in which Germany was exerting pressure on Aus- tria was by insisting that the ultimatum to Serbia should be couched in terms so strong as to make acceptance impossible; here too the Emperor had given the cue on July 6, and here again his lieutenants followed his lead.
As early as July 12 Germany was informed of the contents of the Austrian note, and agreed that it should be delivered about July 25, after Poincare had left Petersburg. The Austrians had decided to make the ultimatum unaccept- able, yet when Berchtold talked on July 17 to Prince Stolberg, Counsellor at the German embassy, he spoke as though it was not yet quite certain whether Serbia would not after all accept the 1 DD, I, No.
IV, No. Stolberg reported to Bethmann Hollweg that he had had difficulty in concealing his displeasure at this hint that Austria might weaken. If the action simply peters out, once again, and ends with a so-called diplomatic success, the belief which is already widely held here that the Monarchy is no longer capable of vigorous action will be dangerously strengthened.
The consequences, internal and external, which would result from this, inside Austria and abroad, are obvious. Then she will crush us on land by weight of numbers, ancT she will have her Baltic fleet and her strategic railways ready. Our group meanwhile is getting steadily weaker. Germany did not care so much what happened over Serbia; the central objective of her diplomacy in these weeks was to split the Entente, and this Bethmann Hollweg meant to en- force at any price, with or without war. In any case the Serbian crisis would bring about a re-grouping of continental power rela- tionships in a sense favourable to Germany and without interven- tion by Britain.
Conrad, op. Ritter, Staatskunst, Vol. DD, I, No. Ill, Vol. X, No. Berchtold was pressing for action now. The Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia After prolonged internal argument, the Austro-Hungarian Minis- terial Council in Vienna decided on the final text of the ultimatum on July 19 and fixed the 23rd as the day for its delivery; both the Austrians and the Germans" thought it prudent to wait until Poin- care and Viviani had left Petersburg, and thus prevent the French and Russians from agreeing immediately on their counter-measures.
The text of the note the substance 1 Albertini, op. From the Doc. Now Germany waited for the presentation of the ultimatum. Vienna thought this the best way of keeping the Serbian action isolated. This despatch, however, also traced out clearly the line which Germany in fact followed : In the interest of localising the war, the government will, as soon as the Austrian note has been presented in Belgrade, initiate diplomatic action directed to the great powers.
The choice of methods must be left to her. This de- mand by GermarryTor a free hand for Austria surprised and dis- pleased Grey, who did not believe that a war could be localised. Russia, yes! She took the risk of war with open eyes. This is confirmed by the preparations taken by Germany when the ultimatum was presented to Serbia. Jagow, for example, asked for the exact itiner- ary of the imperial yacht, because : 1 Id. His Majesty might perhaps spend the last days of his cruise in the Baltic. On the same day the Emperor ordered the concentration of the fleet.
She suggested that Germany might transmit the declaration of war. This sus- picion was, as the German documents prove, com pletely justified, but Zimmermann denied it, as planned, in a telegram sent on the 24th to the German embassies in Paris, London and Petersburg. These fellows [the Serbs] have been intriguing and murdering, and they must be taken down a peg. Her actions, and her motives, can be clearly followed, day by day, in the des- patches.
Moreover, 1 Id. Austria must become predominant in the Balkans. We are advised On the same day Franz Joseph signed the order mobilising eight army corps. The 28th was given as the first day of mobilisation. On the 28th Lichnowsky transmitted yet another the fourth offer of mediation, this time from King George V as well as Grey. In spite of these warnings, when Goschen, the British ambassador in Berlin, officially presented the proposal for a conference, Jagow rejected it.
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His re- plies to London continued to take, as sole basis, the British proposals for localising the conflict. Rome, too, reported the British proposals for mediation, 2 and von Schoen tele- graphed from Paris that France was ready to negotiate. The Austro-Hungarian Declaration of War on Serbia All these appeals and wa rnings fail ed to move Berlin to put any pressure on Vienna to avoid the local conflict. On the contrary, that same day -July Berchtold, urged thereto by Germany, laid the declaration of war before Franz Joseph for his signature.
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Germany, however, as she had stated expressis verbis on July 25, was pressing for a fait accompli to prevent other powers from intervening. The Chancellor accordingly adopted an attitude of reserve towards Bri- tish pressure and showed no inclination to put quick and explicit pressure on Austria. It was only shortly before midnight that he 1 DD, I, No. And before they were passed on Jagow had prepared the ground in another conversation with Szogyeny. We must therefore avoid any action which might cut the line, which so far had worked so well, between Germany and Britain. If we rejected every attempt at mediation the whole world would hold us responsible for the con- flagration and represent us as the real warmongers.
That would also make our position impossible here in Germany , where we have got to appear as though the war had been forced on us. Our position is the more difficult because Serbia seems to have given way very extensively. We cannot therefore reject the role of mediator; we have to pass on the British proposal to Vienna for considera- tion, especially since London and Paris are continuously using their influence on Petersburg.
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Accordingly, he was now deliberately deceived. There is no other explanation for the fact that the Chancellor passed on this new suggestion too, be- latedly, without urgency, and in distorted form. From this point 1 Id. Calm, always calm! A quiet mobilisation is something new. Only under com- pulsion would we resort to the sword, but if we did so, it would be in calm assurance that we were guiltless of the sufferings which war might bring to the peoples of Europe.
Russia alone must bear the responsibility if a European war breaks out. Berchtold rejected any interven- tion as too late. The German government found this delay regrettable, and in his 1 Id. DD, II, No. But a successful war on three fronts viz. It is imperative that the responsibility for any extension of the conflict to Powers not directly con- cerned should under all circumstances fall on Russia alone. The first object was achieved : from the outbreak of the war to the pres- ent day, the chief responsibility for it had been ascribed to Russia.
The hope of British neutrality was to prove a great illusion. It also hoped that neither Italy nor Rumania would be able to intervene actively against Germany. The question whether localisation was possible was raised on the afternoon of July 28, when Conrad asked whether mobilisation was to be carried through against Serbia alone, or also against Russia; for he needed to know which the fronts were to be by the fifth day of mobilisation, or all the troop trains would be sent towards Serbia.
As pendant to his strong attitude towards Russia, Bethmann Hollweg made every effort to appear in British eyes as the ardent searcher after peace. If, however, Russia were saddled with the war guilt, Britain could not take her side. The generals, nevertheless, although still bound by the 1 Conrad, Vol.
IV, pp. In his evening conversation with von Falkenhayn and von Moltke the Chancellor again insisted that Germany must wait until Russia ordered general mobilisation or attacked Austria. For partial mobi- lisation did not create a casus foederis, it did not necessarily involve war. The British immediately grasped the decisive importance of this conversation. That on top of this Germany proposed to march through Belgium, Bethmann Holl- weg had already admitted.
What had held her back hitherto had only been the fear that Britain would come to the help of France and Belgium. In that case she would renounce annexations at the expense of France; but the implied converse of this observance was that if Britain entered the war, Germany, if victorious, would claim a free hand to annex French territory.
Albertini, op. The position had been clarified. Germany had revealed her aims to Britain in the hope that the attempts made by both sides to reach a political settlement would now bear fruit. Now the situation suddenly became threatening. The foundation of their policy during the crisis had collapsed. The telegram sent to Tschirschky at 3 a. We should be two Great Powers against four. With Britain an enemy, the weight of the operations would fall on Germany.
Under these circumstances we must urgently and emphatically suggest to the Vienna cabinet acceptance of mediation under the present honourable conditions. The responsibility falling on us and Austria for the consequences which would ensue in case of refusal would be uncommonly heavy. As late as 1 1. It was only after Further- more, Austria-Hungary had involved herself so deeply in the crisis that neither Berchtold nor Tisza thought it possible for her, as a great power, to give way now to German pressure which, moreover, was not applied with the whole weight available to Germany.
More- over, Vienna had, as the discussions went on, grown ever more con- vinced that the way to strengthen the structure of the Monarchy was by way of a war covered by Germany. But this is not the only circumstance revealing the exceptional character of the documents; there are also the warnings given in the course of July For the very next documents show plainly that what chiefly concerned Bethmann Hollweg was not so much to save the peace as such as to shift the responsibility and guilt for the war on to Russia.
A declaration to this effect, combined with a threat to leave Austria alone if she disregarded it, could have saved the Reich from the catastrophe of a war waged under condi- tions which had become so unfavourable. But nothing was done. On the contrary, the old policy was resumed in the course of the 30th. This emerges clearly from the record of the meeting of the Prus- sian Ministry of State on July 30, to which Bethmann Hollweg re- ported on the situation.
This appears plainly in the despatch sent that evening to Vienna and in its cancellation, which also affected in- directly the German move taken in the course of the night. If [the Chancellor wired to Tschirschky on the evening of July 30] Vienna. This puts us in a quite impossible position in the eyes of our own people. The telegram stresses once again the cardinal importance of British neutrality, of Russian war guilt and of national solidarity as the factors governing German policy. This telegram arrived just before midnight 1 1.
At the same time the Chancellor com- pletely lifted such pressure -and it had been weak enough -as he had been putting on Vienna. Comparison with the instruc- tions sent to Tschirschky 3 makes this more glaring still. Telegram No. Telegram no. Both were handed to the Emperor at 7 a. But the noonday hours of July 30 are important in other respects also. Their effect on Beth- mann Hollweg was to cause temporary hesitations and retreats; on the Emperor it was the opposite.
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