View all notes Russia has periodically albeit unsuccessfully imposed sanctions, blockades, oil and gas shortages, and price hikes to force Moldova to renounce its European choice. Moscow may desist from moving further against Moldova militarily, but it has clearly created a climate of fear and alarm there and in neighboring Romania, and Russia reportedly retains the military power to initiate an operation against Moldova like that mounted in Ukraine. In Georgia, both before and after the war with Russia, Moscow used and expanded the same basic tactics used in Moldova.
Indeed, Putin admitted in that he had preplanned the Russo-Georgian war of as early as with the deliberate cultivation of separatists. View all notes General Yury Baluyevski echoed the point. Moscow's tactics in advance of the war followed the script first worked out for Moldova and later refined in Ukraine. View all notes Here, too, those measures combined multiple instruments of power at Moscow's disposal—diplomatic and political pressure, economic warfare, systematic information attacks, and lastly, albeit more dramatically, military force in In Georgia, Moscow had several apparent objectives, including: prevent the expansion of NATO or the EU to Georgia; demonstrate that these organizations could not and would not protect Georgia; and, reassert Russian domination by demonstrating Russia's ability to take Georgian territory in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russia sought to demonstrate that any effort to join Western security organizations would carry a price and could bring about a change of government in Georgia. View all notes In this context, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's declaration that Moscow would not allow Georgia to join NATO indicates that he and his government viewed Georgia not as a sovereign state, but, as noted above, one whose sovereignty and integrity depended on Russia's assessment of its own interests.
Again, the foundation for this approach was established in the s, as Russia's presence in Georgia grew out of its so-called peacekeeping mission there to quell ethnic wars between Tbilisi and its rebellious provinces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, eds.
View all notes Thus, Russia's foreign minister suggested the prerogatives of Russian power and authority in the former Soviet Union. View all notes Russian relations with Georgia steadily deteriorated as Russia's determination to suppress Georgian independence increasingly collided with Georgia's nationalism and comparable determination to assert that independence and move closer to the West as expressed in the Rose Revoluion of that brought Mikhail Sakaashvili to power in Georgia.
Sakaashvili's determination to restore Georgian rule in South Ossetia and Abkhazia soon clashed with Putin's resolve to prevent Georgia's westernization and to retain Russian influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although, in , Moscow announced that it would vacate its bases in Georgia by , it reportedly reinforced its positions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and took control of local administration; moreover, in Moscow reportedly began to upgrade its espionage activities in Georgia.
View all notes Predictably, Russia initiated sanctions against the export of key Georgian commodities, namely Georgian wine, just as it has periodically done to Moldova. View all notes Russia conducted this economic warfare in tandem with intensifying information, political, and military pressures against Georgia in advance of the war.
By , Russian newspapers were openly speculating about the upcoming war with Georgia and Russian military provocations became routine; Moscow's clients in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were now working steadily with Moscow, agitating for independence from Georgia. Moscow's suspension of its observance of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty CFE also allowed its military buildup in the Caucasus, increased exercises and training to continue unobserved.
View all notes Also during this period, Moscow accelerated its policies to hand out Russian passports to Abkhazians and South Ossetians in order for them to lay claim to Russian citizenship and Moscow's protection. View all notes He also reportedly threatened to take military measures in response. That Moscow was preparing for a war was apparent by the sequence of events leading to the outbreak of open conflict.
View all notes Former U. Moscow undertook a graduated program of reinforcement of the North Caucasus Military district, increased exercises, and rail and other road construction to give Moscow a direct route into Georgia. View all notes It also appears to have maneuvered the impatient Georgian government into a situation that could later be claimed as instigating a war against so-called Russian citizens in August View all notes Moscow's forces were not ready for the Georgian offensive on August 7—8, , probably because it came sooner than anticipated and earlier planning proved inadequate.
However, there is little doubt that Moscow planned and initiated this war. As noted Russian commentator Anton Lavrov writes: Russia, meanwhile, was well aware of the Georgian plans for an attack against South Ossetia. The only crucial detail it did not know was the precise date of the operation. The political decision to protect the vulnerable republic in the event of a Georgian offensive was therefore made well in advance. There was a clear possibility of the entire South Ossetian territory being occupied within days: its territory was small, its armed forces weak, and its capital very vulnerable, being located right on the border with Georgia.
The large Georgian enclaves with the republic were another factor in Georgia's favor. The Russian military command therefore made certain preparations so as to be able to come to the aid of South Ossetia as soon as possible once the Georgian offensive began. Although Russia's military performance was quite poor, it quickly overwhelmed the Georgian forces—validating its strategy of using the ethnic card and the orchestration of combined military and non-military pressures to assert itself, undo Western policies, augment the territory under its control, and strive to revise the post-Cold War territorial settlement.
Immediately after this war, Moscow launched a major military reform effort, the fruits of which can now be seen in Ukraine. To date, Moscow has all but taken over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and incorporated them into Russia.
and otherresidents of Ukraine in Russia is portrayed the image of "brotherly
View all notes During the summer of , Russian forces unilaterally annexed more Georgian territory—apparently to threaten pipelines that connect Georgia to the West. Moscow's aggression against Ukraine has its roots in the war with Georgia. That earlier war confirmed that Moscow could advance its agenda against the West in the CIS by using force in combination with other levers of power in its arsenal, that the West would not intervene, that the costs of such warfare were bearable even if it was preferable not to use force, and that Moscow could play the ethnic card of claiming to protect Russian citizens, foreign citizens of Russian ethnic origin, or Russian language speakers.
Russian planning to subordinate Ukraine appears to have begun almost a decade before the actual Russian attack in —once the effort to subvert Ukraine's presidential election failed, triggering the Orange Revolution. Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin Washington, D. View all notes These events hardened the Russian leadership's convictions that the West was deliberately engineering such color revolutions abroad to destroy Russia's prospects of recovering as a great power and, therefore, that these revolutions had to be suppressed.
Following the war with Georgia, Russia pursued major reforms of its armed forces and the enhancement of Russian capabilities, including innovative tactical, operational, and strategic-military concepts for conflict. Conflict in Ukraine is neither the first nor likely the last scenario in what promises to be a long, drawn-out multi-dimensional conflict between Russia and the West.
Russian military reforms implemented immediately after war with Georgia made its army much more fit for short notice combat, particularly on the periphery of Russia, and provided Moscow with conventional superiority on those peripheries, including the Baltic and now the Black Sea. This last point was confirmed in public speeches at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.
More recently it was confirmed by U. Army officers interviewed by the author, Wiesbaden, Germany, July 28—29, View all notes Moscow also reportedly reformed and increased its types of Special Forces to carry out operations on the periphery. View all notes Predictably, these military capabilities turned up in conjunction with the war in Ukraine. Moscow also redoubled its claim to the right to protect Russians by force in the aforementioned legislation of justification for territorial expansion and the use of force to defend ethnic Russians or Russian speakers was firmly in the lexicon of Russian leaders in the annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbass.
The Russian program to undermine the integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine accelerated and intensified after , when the Ukrainian government led by Viktor Yushchenko vocally supported Georgia in the war with Russia. Moscow's anger immediately manifested itself in a massive expansion of propaganda that the West was behind the so-called color revolutions and was trying to undermine Russia's return to great power status.
Repression at home intensified as did the search for new instruments, in addition to military measures, with which to teach Ukraine and all neighbors a lesson. The energy crises between Russia and Ukraine, in which Moscow turned off the gas at the start of both and , reflected Putin's determination to punish Yushchenko for surviving, winning, and defying Moscow through his policies, and then supporting Georgia in The fact of early strategic planning for what became the annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbass does not mean that war was Russia's preferred option; it was, however, early considered a possible contingency.
Moscow has never come to terms with Ukraine's independence and sovereignty. Army War College, June View all notes The initial idea of invading Ukraine to keep it in the Soviet Union apparently came from Gorbachev's staff in the fall of View all notes Putin frequently has stated publicly that Russia and Ukraine are one people, i. View all notes Putin further claimed that most of its territory was a Russian gift in the s.
Thus Ukraine would cease to exist as a state. By , non-military moves toward the subversion, if not destruction, of Ukraine's independence, integrity and sovereignty had begun. Specifically, Moscow reactivated its support for Crimean independence movements from Ukraine, began a systematic program of informational takeover of Crimea so that its largely ethnic Russian population would have no source of information other than Russian media, intensified efforts to influence Ukrainian politics through energy and other connections, and launched major energy wars against Ukraine in and to isolate it from Europe and, if possible, take over domestic distribution networks there.
Russian intelligence penetration of Ukraine's security services also reportedly intensified around this time. View all notes And, in , as a result of Russian pressure, Moscow secured a treaty giving it control over the naval base at Sevastopol in Crimea through In , Moscow also apparently started recruiting Ukrainians as well as Russians residing in the Baltic states to its youth camps.
This recruitment was part of a larger Russian effort to set up youth organizations loyal to Russia to help prevent an outbreak of color revolutions in Russia as occurred in Georgia and Ukraine. Recruitment of foreign youth, including Russians from the diaspora, is part of Putin's domestic youth policy dating back to —; it reflects his efforts to create a supportive cadre abroad by using ethnic Russian activists. These activities reportedly continue to the present. In , Putin offered Ukraine unsolicited security guarantees in return for permanently stationing the Black Sea Fleet on its territory, a superfluous but ominous gesture since Russia had already guaranteed Ukraine's security through the Tashkent treaty of and the Budapest Memorandum to denuclearize Ukraine.
In short, Russian military, economic, informational, ideological, and other forms of penetration of the Crimea in anticipation of an overall nullification of Ukraine's sovereignty over the area were long-standing and well known. Further deterioration of relations became evident when, on August 11, , President Medvedev published an open letter lambasting Ukraine's policies, and announcing that Russia would withhold sending its new ambassador to Ukraine.
Medvedev also called upon the Ukrainian people to elect a new pro-Russian president. View all notes Medvedev specifically charged that: The leadership in Kiev took an openly anti-Russian stand following the military attack launched by the Saakashvili regime against South Ossetia. Ukrainian weapons were used to kill civilians and Russian peacekeepers. Russia continues to experience problems caused by a policy aimed at obstructing the operations of its Black Sea Fleet, and this on a daily basis and in violation of the basic agreements between our countries.
Sadly, the campaign continues to oust the Russian language from the Ukrainian media, the education, culture and science. The Ukrainian leadership's outwardly smooth-flowing rhetoric fits ill with the overt distortion of complex and difficult episodes in our common history, the tragic events of the great famine in the Soviet Union, and an interpretation of the Great Patriotic War as some kind of confrontation between two totalitarian systems.
Our economic relations are in a somewhat better situation and are developing, but we have not yet succeeded in tapping their full potential. Again, the problem is that Russian companies frequently face open resistance from the Ukrainian authorities. Bypassing Russia, Ukraine's political leaders do deals with the European Union on supplying gas—gas from Russia—and sign a document that completely contradicts the Russian-Ukrainian agreements reached in January this year.
Medvedev's statement reiterated Putin's assessment of Ukraine's sovereignty and the sovereignty of other CIS governments. It made clear that what angered Russia was the idea that Ukraine might exercise the prerogatives of an independent state and demand that Russia not interfere in its politics and elections. The election of Viktor Yanukovych gave Russia a Ukrainian leader susceptible to Moscow's persuasions.
In the mistaken belief that Russian pressure would subsequently ease, as noted above, Yanukovych signed a new treaty with Russia in giving Moscow control over the naval base at Sevastopol through and a favorable energy deal. Moscow got what it wanted, a government in Ukraine that essentially refused to join the West and gave Moscow greater license in Crimea.
By , Ukraine's crisis of governance was in full swing as it attempted to navigate between signing an Association Agreement with the EU and Russian pressure. Russia successfully pressured Ukraine to suspend signature of an agreement with the EU via the threat of crippling trade sanctions. David M. View all notes Moscow intensified its ongoing operations throughout Ukraine and outlined a policy of coercing and influencing key sectors of the Ukrainian population and government.
This document presented a systematic plan for coercing and influencing key sectors and threatening economic elites with sanctions, including trade wars, even as it called for systematic large-scale propaganda efforts to influence Ukrainian opinion. View all notes This document and the policies it advocated embodied the economic-political-informational side of Russian policy. Simultaneously, the military concept for a future operation against Ukraine was being formulated. In , Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov published a seminal article outlining the kind of war that Moscow attributed to the West, but would also plan to fight.
The emphasis in methods of struggle is shifting toward widespread use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures, implemented through the involvement of the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by covert military measures, including implementation of measures by information struggle and the actions of special operations forces.
Overt use of force, often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis management occurs only at a certain stage, primarily to achieve definitive success in the conflict. Under severe Russian pressure, Yanukovych backed away from the EU agreement. View all notes In doing so, he triggered the eruption of revolutionary demonstrations in Ukraine known as the Euro-Maidan Euro Square , which began in November Throughout this period, Moscow reportedly kept the pressure on Yanukovych to intensify the use of repression, but his efforts to use force were ineffective, indecisive and, ultimately, backfired.
Moscow responded by shifting into high gear to plan the direct takeover of Crimea. By February , Moscow had assembled many of the cards it would play through the systematic use of economic sanctions, preferences, manipulation of trade with Ukraine, particularly involving energy; it also had honed its military instrument. By February, in advance of Yanukovych's departure on February 22, the operation had begun. Russia indirectly acknowledged this by striking medals awarded to Russian soldiers who participated in Crimea and Donbass operations with an inscription that operations began on February 20, —which indicates that the medals were awarded for actions taken prior to the start of armed conflict.
View all notes Putin's contention that he launched the operation on February 22 just after Yanukovych's departure appears to be false. Russia's Crimean and Donbass actions can be understood in the light of these preparations and subsequent operations. They represent the coordinated work of many, if not all, of the disparate parts of the Russian state apparatus, and reflect prior planning. Hill and Gaddy see things similarly; see, Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin , op.
Those elements include playing the ethnic card and the invocation of Russia's right and duty to intervene coercively and forcefully on behalf of supposedly endangered ethnic Russians or Russian speakers. Ukraine also appears to be a testing ground for a long-term, multi-dimensional war of attrition in multiple theaters against the West.
The Putin leadership confronts the West with a comprehensive, adaptable and mature strategy, not simply strategic improvisation. In September , Russia became increasingly involved militarily in Syria in direct support of the Assad regime, including reported ground combat. View all notes Indeed, Israel has stated publicly that Russia is sending troops into Syria. View all notes Moscow apparently is building a military air base and deploying long-range strike aircraft, close air support aircraft and air-dominance fighter aircraft.
View all notes In addition, Russia reportedly is building a base for 1, ground force troops near the existing Russian naval supply base. View all notes Its troops also reportedly will man advanced Russian SA surface-to-air missiles being sold to Syria. Michael R. Russian actions in Syria risk a confrontation between U. At this time, eighty percent of Russian air strikes reportedly have not been targeted against ISIS, but rather against anti-Assad insurgents, 91 View all notes Russian aircraft reportedly have entered Turkish air space. Andrew V. View all notes In addition, the Russian use of conventionally-armed but nuclear-capable Kalibr cruise missiles against targets in Syria appears to be a message to the U.
Russia appears to be supporting a former Soviet client state and solidifying an anti-U. View all notes Moscow may hope that demonstrating a willingness to use force and accept casualties will influence European attitudes concerning ending sanctions against Russia over Ukraine, 96 View all notes although Russian involvement in Syria will increase the already considerable strain of the Ukrainian conflict on the Russian economy. Simultaneously, Moscow also is trying to minimize internal domestic perceptions of its involvement in Syria, presumably because of concern that this intervention ultimately could prove to be unpopular.
Alexander Golts has suggested that Putin's motive in Syria relates to diverting attention from the Ukraine. For Putin, an overall understanding founded on facing a common enemy must include the termination of sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia for the annexation of Crimea and engagement in fighting in eastern Ukraine. The activity in Syria and around Syria means Russia is able to come back to the Middle East, not as a superpower, but as something that can balance the power of the West and the United States.
View all notes If so, the geographical arena in which Russia seeks to play a pivotal role, and in which Putin will act militarily, is not limited to former Soviet republics and members of the Warsaw Pact. A recent discussion of Syria in the Russian-state sponsored news service, Sputnik International , certainly suggests that this broader Russian goal underlies Russia's military intervention in Syria. The most important of them is that Moscow is not afraid of making bold decisions.
View all notes This situation continues to evolve, but it is clear at this point that Putin sees unprecedented license to move militarily. As of today, Ukraine remains a paradigmatic example of Russian hybrid warfare tactics, which may be repeated elsewhere. Military operations are ongoing and escalating. View all notes By August , Putin's aggression had cost the Ukrainian Army 2, dead and 7, wounded.
View all notes And, according to a possibly inadvertent Russian report, 2, Russian troops have been killed in fighting in Eastern Ukraine while reportedly 3, have been wounded. View all notes In February , German intelligence reportedly estimated the civilian death toll at 50, View all notes Russia announced in August that it had absorbed one million refugees from the war.
Moscow has moved from the outright annexation of Crimea by military means, to its new accords with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, which presage a gradual, de facto annexation. From Georgia to Ukraine, Russia has steadily improved its capability for executing this kind of war. Moscow, however, clearly has miscalculated popular support and rebel capability in the Donbass and has thus been obliged to invest much more directly there and has incurred Western sanctions.
Despite this setback, Russia continues to speak and act belligerently, thereby increasing the possibility of further confrontation and escalation of conflict. These case studies, including Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, demonstrate a consistent defining and driving goal of the Putin regime. Indeed, recognition of this reality is crucial to an understanding of contemporary Russian goals and strategy.
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Post Russian military reforms apparently have succeeded in their primary purpose of generating a force that can win limited wars on Russia's peripheries, provide coercive nuclear threats, and maintain a significant military superiority along its frontier with smaller neighbors. There are reports by former U. View all notes Putin publicly stated that Russia was prepared for a nuclear alert when he launched the Crimean operation in February Since then, Russian officials repeatedly have stated that because Crimea is now part of Russia, Moscow has the right to station nuclear weapons there.
Sergei L. After taking Ukrainian territories, Russian military leaders have publicly raised the issue of a limited Russian nuclear escalation should NATO intervene in response to Russian aggression in the Crimea. Russia appears to be building a spectrum of nuclear capabilities that will provide it with a range of flexible nuclear options throughout the entire European theater from the Arctic to the Black Sea. View all notes Beyond those potential operational vistas, moreover, the record of nuclear rhetoric, exercises, and signaling since the onset of the Ukrainian crisis demonstrates that Moscow regards its nuclear weapons as essential elements of its overall strategy and as a screen behind which it can deploy its conventional and non-military assets in a synchronized strategy to transform the post-Cold War order.
Subsequent chapters will examine how Russian threats, including nuclear threats, its robust nuclear force modernization program, and its pattern of violating arms control agreements—particularly the Intermediate Nuclear Forces INF Treaty—appear to be integral elements in the broad Russian grand strategy identified in Chapter One and demonstrated here in Chapter Two. Russia's foreign and defense policies are driven by its perception of world events and threats to its security. Russia's attitudes toward the West reflect a combination of Soviet-era hostility, lingering resentment and a desire to reassert its status as a great power in global affairs—consistent with the goals and objectives of Russia's foreign policy described in Chapter One.
As Moscow's public posturing has become increasingly anti-American and anti-Western, its foreign and defense policies have become more threatening. This growing hostility toward the West, including Russia's military posturing toward Japan, increases the potential for conflict. The Russian worldview appears to be based on the premise that the United States seeks to: 1 destroy Russia; 2 dismember it; and 3 steal its natural resources, and that the United States may attack at any time.
View all notes This alleged Western hostility serves as a justification for current Russian aggression against its neighbors and the suppression of democracy within Russia itself. It is symptomatic of a Russian worldview that often is characterized as paranoid. In January , the chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee, Konstantin Kosachev, wrote that Russian military strategists believe that the chief and maybe the only threat to Russia, as in Soviet times, is posed by a possible U. Senior Russian leaders often express their perceptions of a West that is nefarious and hostile toward Russia.
Such expressions likely appear wholly unrealistic to knowledgeable Western audiences, but they are the norm among Russian civilian and military leaders, with many speaking openly of a major war over the country's natural resources. View all notes Patruschev stated that the U. View all notes In fact, Russia blames the Ukraine situation on the U. S, arguing that Kiev is a U. Moscow sees pro-democracy movements in Russia and the former Soviet republics as a direct threat to Russian national security, attributes them to Western intelligence organizations, and is prepared to oppose them by force.
The conditions and pretexts were created for colour revolutions, supported by generous state funding. In November , President Putin declared that a color revolution in Russia must be prevented. They are already planning their actions for the upcoming election campaigns of — View all notes Dr. View all notes Correspondingly, there is concern, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, about the possibility of a Russian attack. In the context of its continued war against Ukraine, Russia is applying threats and pressure not only against vulnerable NATO states, but against neutral countries like Sweden and Finland.
This saber rattling is taken seriously by NATO's senior military leadership.
Psychological Aspects of Russia Ukrine War
Legacy Soviet attitudes toward the West have always been a major factor in Russian foreign and defense policy. View all notes While the communist ideology is gone, the hostility it spawned toward the West continues. Russia's immediate post-Cold War public line expressed by then-President Boris Yeltsin that Russia had no enemies was replaced by the Putin view that the U. Russian hostility toward the U. Even when U. Bush administration, legacy Soviet hostility simmered. Putin blamed the West for the Beslan terrorist atrocity that killed hundreds of schoolchildren and other hostages. They are helping because they believe that, as one of the world's major nuclear powers, Russia is still posing a threat to someone, and therefore this threat must be removed.
And terrorism is, of course, only a tool for achieving these goals. View all notes In , Putin compared the U. Russian hostility toward the West has long been reflected in official statements about large-scale war and even nuclear war. Since , senior Russian generals have made repeated nuclear threats, statements about border nuclear wars, nuclear wars over natural resources or the Arctic Ocean's energy resources, as well as countless expressions against U. View all notes In fact, Russia is now claiming a vast expanse of the Arctic Ocean and is reactivating Soviet-era Arctic military bases to enforce this claim.
Andrew E. In —, Russian hostility toward the West reached extraordinary levels with Russia preparing to fight on all fronts, but particularly against the U. Why are you so afraid? View all notes As discussed below, Russian threats, provocative bomber flights, and military exercises have reached unprecedented levels. In Asia, Russian-Japanese relations have deteriorated because of aggressive Russian threats and military activities.
Russia has displayed increasing hostility toward Japan in recent years, though not on the same scale as toward the United States and NATO. In , the Japanese Defense Ministry reported that Russia had increased military deployments on the Kuril Islands some of which are claimed by Japan and was conducting an increased number of military exercises near Japan.
View all notes In , Russia announced that it would deploy combat vehicles to the Kuril Islands, while acknowledging that since it had deployed modern military vehicles to these Islands. View all notes Russia also indicated that it would build military facilities on the Islands by View all notes In June , Russia said it had accelerated military construction on the Kuril Islands, including on Iturup, one of the islands claimed by Japan. Contemporary Russian nuclear doctrine reportedly was developed mainly by Vladimir Putin when he was Secretary of the Russian National Security Council and he signed it into law when he was acting Russian President in View all notes This doctrine reflects strong hostility to the West and allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in conventional wars.
The details of this doctrine are discussed in the next chapter, but it is important to underscore that the doctrine is deliberately threatening to the West—apparently to influence Western policy decisions on a variety of issues, the most important of which relates to Russia's desire for dominance in Europe. View all notes Thus, a key driver behind Putin's nuclear doctrine was not only the desire to deter attack on Russia—which previous Russian nuclear doctrinal formulations certainly did—but to return Russia to superpower status by employing the threat of nuclear strikes, including nuclear weapons use in circumstances where no Western nation would likely consider using nuclear weapons.
This expanded formulation appears to have been integrated into Russian defense planning. The Putin nuclear first-use doctrine was announced at a time when no other European state believed there was a serious possibility of a major European war, much less a nuclear war. The declassification of the Warsaw Pact war plan by several former Warsaw Pact states confirmed that Putin's nuclear doctrine was actually an evolution of the earlier Soviet nuclear doctrine, which reportedly allowed for the large-scale first use of nuclear weapons in a major conventional war.
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Z; William E. We have the doctrine of national security, and it very clearly regulates the actions, which will be taken in this case. View all notes Emphasis in the original. This is a much more permissive formulation than the public version of the doctrine. Russian nuclear doctrine does not focus explicitly on Japan, probably because Japan has very limited offensive capabilities. In addition, it is not in Russia's interest to scare Japan, a country with the third largest economy in the world, into developing or acquiring its own nuclear weapons.
Nonetheless, Russia's nuclear doctrine envisions the first use of nuclear weapons when the security of the Russian Federation is perceived to be at risk—an ambiguous construct that could apply to Japan given Japanese claims on Kuril Islands and Japan's mutual security treaty with the United States. Russia employs nuclear threats not only to highlight its significant military capability, but to buttress its political clout against the West.
Since Russia today likely lacks the economic power, the manpower, and conventional military power to defeat NATO in a protracted conventional war, nuclear weapons are seen as the most important tool in the Russian arsenal for advancing both political and military objectives. Nuclear weapons are perceived as able to defeat advanced conventional weapons in wartime, thus offsetting U.
View all notes Russian nuclear threats are a way of advertising this capability. Russia has adopted the view that fear of nuclear war can be exploited to help advance the Russian agenda of creating a sphere of influence over former Soviet and former Warsaw Pact states by coercing them into acceptance of Russian domination and rejection of both Western democracy and integration into the European Union. So what are you trying to prove? Not only Russian? And who said 'only'? When the Romans used slaves, - there was no Russia to start with.
Just because the Mongols took prisoners and made them slaves, the Muscovites did not need to follow their leadership, they keep pretending to be Christians after all! Does any of that explain Russian 'black one-hundreds' Cherno-sotenniki? The two 'exotics' have long sold their souls to the Kremlin and are now just talking to themselves to secure their year-end bonus. An act of desperation, no less. Lupe Wadosy is as crazy as a loon and he keeps talking to himself answering himself in sometimes over five consecutive posts, often totally off topic. He's a kind of a homespun philosopher with a serious, psychopathic bend on "neocons".
A peculiar fellow. Yes, but only after the rest of the world grabs Putin by his balls and starts squeezing. This scenario is actually quite close and, by , Russia will likely suffer another crisis triggered by global oil and gas price drop as well as shrinking output of its oil and gas wells. If we add an insult to injury, i. Russia has already started paying for the sins of its Tsarist and Soviet past, and the worst is yet to come.
Why the hell should Ukraine save Russia from sinking into the manure of its own and its predecessor Soviet Union's making? Gulag was the rationalization of a reclusory and forced labour system,not only russian at all and even less "invented" by russians the french had the "Cayenne", and other nations had more or less the same, since the time of Romans ". I am not Russian but I feel great respect and graditude for Sovoks as you call them.
It was the Soviet people that turned history and we are today free to discuss such matters instead of working Arian farms as earth-bound slaves of the Herenvolk. It was the Soviet people that fought and died by the millions for the benefit of coming generations not only in the Soviet Union but in the world. There may have been goulags but it was also a time of optimism, solidarity, great projects and victories. With all due respect, are you delusional or another Sovok at work for 85 rubles per post?
If it weren't for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the US entering the fry with all its humongous industrial and human potential you'd have spoken Russian or German in a labour camp instead of your native language whatever it is. How regrettable that you have totally missed two key issues: 1 The term 'Soviet people' defined the state, not nations.
You must have missed it, but they all including the Russians, the Ukrainians, Latvians, Georgians and many others proclaimed independent national states, not Soviet Republics. Is this news for you? And now all these nations are ready to stand on guard protecting their hard won independence. Why do you have problems with their choice? This is a refreshing writeup by Dmitri Trenin, a former Soviet and Russian high-ranking military spy turned political scientist. He seems to understand some problems Russia is facing but does nothing to alleviate them. To live up to the challenge that they may not have clearly seen even a month ago, the Europeans need steady leadership.
It is right for Germany to begin playing a role it has long grown to assume. Even if the EU and Germany are not ready to foot the bill, there is no turning back to pre-Vilnius, pre-Maidan days. Europe has made Ukraine an offer, and now it must live with its implications. And we all would speak german all the same, with the righ harm and hand stubbornly raised I. Are you off your rocker or what? The Lend-Lease programme started in August , i. Also , plus US troops in Germany stay there for a reason, while the world largest bank Deutsche Bank would have been reduced to a credit union or a building society status overnight if the US regulators pulled its US operating licence off.
I believe that Russia is panicky afraid of the Visegrad Group Ukraine has already received a formal invitation to join after having signed the EU association agreement. Also Austria and Sweden want to become associated members of the Group. If they're not drown in Wiborowa This was nine months before the U. The Gereat Britain and France were receiving limited American aid even before the signing of the Lend-Lease Agreement, but the Soviet Union was added later, after June , and received its first supplies in September Nevertheless the implementation of the agreement started physically in August and as late as in the early the Soviets started receiving significant amounts of US supplies.
Nobody knows what conditions this move may involve, like for example possible Russian control of the gas pipeline system. But then there are rumors of renewed EU interest in a concept of a Tri-party control and modernisation of that system. We should learn more in a day or two. Putin doesn't have to advance anything to Yanuk, as most Ukraine's indebtedness is to Russia. Gazprom, after filing its statement of claims, would have to comply with the rules of discovery requiring that even the most confidential information be disclosed during closed, non-public hearings.
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Having known Russia's secrecy paranoia I'd bet a week profits that Gazprom wouldn't comply and drop the suit. Russia's public tone is extremely low and reconciliatory now, for Putin and Lavrow, as well as Yanukovych never expected the size of spontaneous protests and the level of determination of the protesters in Ukraine, nor the strong and open on the government levels support of the rest of the world, mainly the EU, the US, Australia and Canada. My original answer was directed to the initiator of this thread ippias, another Sovok, and you jumped in the middle.
The details you've got right are not essential, as the original point was a loony claim of ippias. But without a concrete, informed, and executable social, economic, political road map or principle to guide to the future, little will change Of course it feels warm and good when the old junk and rotten were thrown into the fires of revolution and be burnt out of existence. However conctrete irons to shape the fuutre must also be thrown in to be tempered and tested along with the fire. There are revolutions that eneded with the forming of new steel and iron Please, read this fair analysis of possible outcomes Ukraine can expect to put up with in both scenarios; joining the EU, or joining the Russian-dominated customs union.
One caveat emptor, the EU economy is about seven to eight time Russia's if we assume the GDP sizes as the measuring sticks. During the orange times the Ukraine GDP nosedive by This is why E Ukraine in its majority prefers tighter cooperation with Russia and Yanukovych don't give a flying fart about the W Ukraine whine - those are non productive takers. To angry losers like yourself the will of the E Ukraine people may look strange, but in reality they do not give a flying fart about the broke and sinking EU and prefer tighter integration with rich and powerful Russia, heh, heh, heh :D. The EU would just milk us for all we've got.
We'd get nothing in return. Don't worry and take it easy! Lenin's monument in Luhansk will be down as well. Have you already posted enough garbage to earn your Christmas bonus? BTW, you're late. A rather pathetic show of old factory workers and pensioners. It's a descending, old generation that cannot stop Ukraine's progress. The city is also dirty and looks neglected. This has to be spread as widely as possible in order to expose the true nature of Ukrainian president Yanukovych and his kleptocracy.
Yanukovych lives in a fantasy world that is soon going to crash in on him. He agrees to a meeting organized by former President Kravchuk with church leaders and the opposition and, not only does Yanukovych not agree to anything, but the live feed of the event is sabotaged. It would be nice to have the Maidan surround his expensive and grotesque mansion at Mezhyhyria.
Yanuchescu promises the Europeans one thing, and next week he is off to meet Chekist plastic-surgery lover Putin for further instructions. Yanukovych is a political corpse dead in the water, but he's still very dangerous, as he doesn't have any fall back position and he may still resort to using force even if the consequence would be bloodshed. There's also a very disturbing problem with the opposition that is unable to cooperate or agree on any kind of a political program, let alone work out a common vision.
The EU reportedly sent the Ukrainian delegation packing and terminated further negotiations until next election in Ukraine. This may trigger more government violence against peaceful protesters and persecution of Yanukovych's political opponents. The only hope left is a truthful reporting of the protest by two US senators visiting Kyiv and their decisive demands that the US in coordination with the EU, Canada and Australia slap sanctions on some members of the Yanukovych administration guilty of breaking the law.
Actually, back to you, as most of your comments, even on other fora, are encore rants full of the same, recycled anti-"neocon" "arguments" with links to the same or similar "sources". You're obsessed with anti-"neocon" conspiracy theories, most of them quite loony. Don't assault Sergeiy Lavrov's intelligence! Lavrov is a well-trained diplomat of the same or similar calibre as his infamous predecessors Molotov and Gromyko aka Mister Nyet.
This guy is a pathetic conspiracy theorist repeating anti-"neocon" mantras and recycling the same overplayed "arguments". He's a one-shot-game. Yeah, Observer, I kind of got the impression he wears a tinfoil hat against some neo-con master plan. To him, these "neocons" seem to be behind everything wrong in the world, including his kitchen sink overflowing. He's a maniac with some encyclopaedic knowledge but without understanding of economics, finance, geology and mining as well as global political dynamics.
If he doesn't understand something the "neocons" are at fault. The slides of the picture gallery need to be edited to correspond the current politically correct labeling and propagandistic concepts of the EU. Slide 1: One of the 3 flags visible is the flag of a xenophobic racist extreme-right nationalistic anti-Semitic party "Svoboda" none of the labels is true except "nationalist", but all of them have been used in Western media Slide 2: A portrait of imprisoned presidential candidate Ms Timoshenko is visible.
One week before protests started, Swiss public TV network described her as "a thieving fallen star" whose hidden illigal assets the Swiss prosecutor office is investigating in a cordial accord with the Ukrainian prosecutors. Slide 3: Some protesters masked their faces. In most of the Europe it is a capital offence to mask your face. In a recent referendum to ban Islamic veil, the Swiss actually banned masking faces in public places instead. The Ukrainian dictator and Ukrainian Gestapo would love such law.
Yanukovich and his Gestapo are so European. Slide 4: Protestors are committing a serious offence by spraying water on police. In the UK, just for calling to riot on Facebook, a teenager was sentenced to 4 years in prison. For spraying police, one could face 40 years in prison. Slide 5: "A couple" takes pictures. It is impossible to determine if the couple is 2 men or a man and a woman. So progressive! Slide 7: Anti-Yanukovich protesters, some with masked faces. Extremely illegal! They'll be prosecuted once Ukraine is a member of EU.
Slide 8: A pro-European protester. Add here: pro-gay, pro-lesbian, pro-tolerance, pro-migrant, pro-population replacement, Muslim-friendly and any other convenient label as you pleased. Slide 9: Even girls have masked faces. Nich gut!!!! Slide A black-and-red banner is visible. It is the flag of a Ukrainian national liberation movement from the past. FIFA banned a Ukrainian stadium until because fans showed up with this flag. Impressed by the racism documentary, MI-6 arrested a years old Ukrainian PhD during his 2 months internship in UK, on charges of bombing mosques and killing an 80 year old grand father in UK.
Nothing like this against Muslim or anybode else ever happened in Ukraine. It only made sense to MI-6 that watch the Polish documentary on racism. The PhD later pleaded guilty and was sentenced. The only prove is a video from a surveyance camera. Now, you, European Morons, when will you rise against your fascist rulers!? BTW, learn the meaning of the phrase "a capital offence".
Where did you copy that idiocy from before pasting this garbage here? My friend, I know the meaning of capital offence. You, on the other hand, should think of the word "sarcasm", the meaning of which you certanely know. It is impossible though to learn to recognize sarcasm. Recognizing sarcasm is an innate trait. There is a lot of sarcasm in my rant. But also a lot of facts. I by the way tried to edit "capital" to replace it by "serious", but the web site did not save it. I think that it is high time for Ukraine to show the door to the inhabitants of the Lvov Lviv area. The Poles there can have their own mini state to play with or join Poland and their beloved European Union.
In either case Ukraine will be much better off. Maybe it is time for Ukraine to leave other territories taken by Stalin after Let's start with Bukovina, S Moldavia, then parts of Transcarpathia. Then Crimea and E Ukraine. What is left is the real Ukraine. Your worldview is that of a Russian Sovok which is a dying breed. Ulysses, you know nothing of Ukraine then.
It seems you hold the world-view of somebody a minority who still quaintly believes in a Greater Romania and is anti-Ukrainian, or are you one of those geniuses who believes your country is the direct descendant of Ancient Rome? Plus Eastern Ukraine was always ethnically Ukrainian; its demographics only changed after Stalin's genocide, the Holodomor in , after which Russian colonists were brought in. For that matter, the same happened to the Ukrainian Kuban. In any event, Ulysses, neither the people of Bukovyna nor Transcarpathia wish to leave Ukraine for Romania or Hungary - what an absolutely ridiculous idea, unless of course one is a modern day fascist!
Or do you propose to take over these territories by gunpoint as was done in the past. If Georgia joins Ukraine on this path, its whole rapprochementwith the EU would be gravely jeopardised. To add even more ambiguity to the situation, Prime Minister Ivanishvili recently suggested that he might consider whether the Eurasian Union has anything interesting to offer for Georgia. This was quite a change of tone in the one Eastern Partnership country which, until recently, boasted the strongest pro-EU and pro-NATO consensus among both the elites and the public.
Track changes Moldova, which is the best pupil in a problematic class, is on a firmer track to initial and sign the agreements with the EU. Yet it has just emerged from a five-month-long domestic political crisis that almost derailed the process. Significant reforms still need to be carried out, not least the reforming of law-enforcement agencies. And Russia is likely to start turning up the diplomatic heat. Moldova is likely to resist, but its resilience depends quite a lot on that of Ukraine. The other two countries of the region, Belarus and Azerbaijan, are rather disinterested in the Eastern Partnership and have been mostly reluctant to sign up to what the Eastern Partnership had to offer.
Azerbaijan has a strong energy partnership with the EU, but is rather uninterested in political reforms or non-energy related trade dialogue with the EU. In Armenia, things were tricky from the very beginning. Erevan is a close military ally of Moscow, although it trades more with the EU than with Russia 27 percent vs. But once Russia launched its own economic project — the Customs Union, designed eventually to lead to a Eurasian Union — Armenia found itself stymied in its attempt to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds.
In September, Armenia stunned EU foreign policy watchers when it gave up on its association and free trade deal with the EU just a few weeks after negotiations had been finalised. The move followed Russian demands for Armenia to join the Russia-led Customs Union, thereby excluding the possibility of a free trade agreement with the EU. The shape of things to come? The EU, which has spent the last two decades managing a queue of almost two dozen countries vying to enter the club, is simply not used to being rejected by countries such as Armenia.
The Union is right to feel uneasy. Its influence in world affairs should not be taken for granted and it will become increasingly dependent on the ability of member states to stick together in economic, security, and foreign policy matters. If anything, the real surprise was that Armenia managed to advance so far in its relations with the EU, openly defying Russian preferences in the process. A player, not a victim European policy circles also reacted with outpourings of pity for Armenia.
The prevailing view was that a small state had been bullied by a former imperial master into acting against its will and interests.