Cheapfakes already call into question the methods of evidence that scientists, courts, and newsrooms traditionally use to call for accountability. Many will never know the video was a fake, but the advantages it gave to pundits will echo into the future.
Those wishing to deny the truth can create disinformation to support their lie, while those caught behaving badly can write off the evidence of bad behavior as disinformation. In a new survey from Pew Research Center, 63 percent of respondents said that they believe altered video and images are a significant source of confusion when it comes to interpreting news quality. That loss of trust works in favor of those willing to lie, defame, and harass to gain attention. They do it for a host of reasons, not the least of which is simply because a message speaks to what users see as an implicit truth of the world even as they know it is not factually true.
Researchers have found that creating and sharing hateful, false, or faked content is often rewarded on platforms like Facebook. The looming threat of the deepfake is worth attention—from politicians, like at the upcoming hearing; from journalists; from researchers; and especially from the public that will ultimately be the audience for these things.
Oman attack: Iran is the immediate, but unlikely, suspect U. And even if they knew, what could be done without risking all-out war? Who, then, struck the tankers? Whom does this strike serve and what can be done against such attacks? In all previous attacks in the Gulf in recent weeks Iran was naturally taken to be the immediate suspect. But this explanation is too easy. The Iranian regime is in the thrones of a major diplomatic struggle to persuade Europe and its allies, Russia and China, not to take the path of pulling out of the nuclear agreement.
At the same time, Iran is sure that the United States is only looking for an excuse to attack it. Iran has announced it would scale back its commitments under the nuclear deal by expanding its low-level uranium enrichment and not transferring the remainder of its enriched uranium and heavy water to another country, as the agreement requires. It seems that alongside its diplomatic efforts, Iran prefers to threaten to harm the nuclear deal itself, responding to Washington with the same token, rather than escalate the situation to a military clash.
Other possible suspects are the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, who continue to pound Saudi targets with medium-range missiles, as was the case last week with strikes on the Abha and Jizan airports, near the Yemeni border, which wounded 26 people. The Houthis have also fired missiles at Riyadh and hit targets in the Gulf. In response, Saudi Arabia launched a massive missile strike on Houthi-controlled areas in northern Yemen. The Houthis have claimed responsibility for some of their actions in Saudi territory in the past, and at times even took the trouble of explaining the reasons behind this assault or the other.
But not this time. Yemen also hosts large Al-Qaida cells and Islamic State outposts, with both groups having a running account with Saudi Arabia and apparently the capabilities to carry out strikes on vessels moving through the Gulf. In the absence of confirmed and reliable information on the source of the fire, we may meanwhile discount the possibility of a Saudi or American provocation at which Iran has hinted, but such things have happened before. However, we may also wonder why some of the most sophisticated intelligence services in the world are having so much trouble discovering who actually carried out these attacks.
Thwarting such attacks with no precise intelligence is an almost impossible task, but even if the identity of those responsible for it is known, the question of how to respond to the threat would still arise. The concern is that such a military response would lead Iran to escalate its own and openly strike American and Saudi targets in the name of self-defense and protecting its sovereignty. In that case, a large-scale war would be inevitable. President Donald Trump, who wants to extricate his forces from military involvement in the Middle East, truly seeks such a conflict, which could suck more and more American forces into this sensitive arena.
An escape route from this scenario would require intensive mediation efforts between Iran and the United States, but therein lies one major difficulty — finding an authoritative mediator that could pressure both parties. Russia or China are not suitable candidates, and ties between Washington and the European Union are acrimonious. It seems that all sides would be satisfied if they could place responsibility for the attacks on the Houthis or other terror groups. That is not to say that the United States or Saudi Arabia have any magic solutions when it comes to the Houthis; far from it.
The war in Yemen has been going on for five years now with no military resolution, and increased bombardment of concentrations of Houthi forces could only expand their efforts to show their strength. But the United States would pay none of the diplomatic or military price for assaults on the Houthis it would for a forceful violent response against Iran itself.
If sporadic, small-scale attacks raise such complex dilemmas, one can perhaps dream of an all-out war with Iran, but it is enough to look at the chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan to grow extremely cautious of the trajectory in which such dreams become a nightmare that lasts for decades. The Kokuka Courageous is now sailing toward the port of Khor Fakkan in the United Arab Emirates, with the crew having returned to the ship after evacuating because of the incident, Kokuka President Yutaka Katada told a press conference.
It was being escorted by the U. Navy, he said. Katada said there was no possibility that the ship, carrying 25, tons of methanol, was hit by a torpedo. Katada said he did not believe Kokuka Courageous was targetted because it was owned by a Japanese firm. The tanker is registered in Panama and was flying a Panamanian flag, he said. Training artificial intelligence is an energy intensive process. New estimates suggest that the carbon footprint of training a single AI is as much as tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent — five times the lifetime emissions of an average car.
If you were paying close attention last week, you might have spotted a pattern in the news. Photos from a Border Patrol processing center in El Paso showed people herded so tightly into cells that they had to stand on toilets to breathe. These followed another report that showed that thousands of detainees are being brutally held in isolation cells just for being transgender or mentally ill. In the last year, at least seven migrant children have died in federal custody.
Preventing mass outrage at a system like this takes work. Certainly it helps that the news media covers these horrors intermittently rather than as snowballing proof of a racist, lawless administration. But most of all, authorities prevail when the places where people are being tortured and left to die stay hidden, misleadingly named and far from prying eyes. You might balk at my use of the term. The goal of concentration camps has always been to be ignored. The German-Jewish political theorist Hannah Arendt, who was imprisoned by the Gestapo and interned in a French camp, wrote a few years afterward about the different levels of concentration camps.
Euphemisms play a big role in that forgetting. When President Franklin D. It took five years to begin the mass detention of Jews. It took eight, and the outbreak of a world war, for the first extermination camps to open. Even then, the Nazis had to keep lying to distract attention, claiming Jews were merely being resettled to remote work sites. A year ago, Americans accidentally became aware that the Trump administration had adopted and lied about a policy of ripping families apart at the border.
Trump shoved that easily down the memory hole.
He dragged his heels a bit, then agreed to a new policy: throwing whole families into camps together. Political reporters posed irrelevant questions, like whether President Obama had been just as bad, and what it meant for the midterms. Then they moved on. Several camps opened under Obama, and as president he deported millions of people. Trump has made it clear that he wants to stifle all non-white immigration, period.
His mass arrests, iceboxes and dog cages are part of an explicitly nationalist project to put the country under the control of the right kind of white people. If we call them what they are — a growing system of American concentration camps — we will be more likely to give them the attention they deserve.
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With constant, unrelenting attention, it is possible we might alleviate the plight of the people inside, and stop the crisis from getting worse. Trump is instinctively an authoritarian. Debates raged over a label for what is happening along the southern border and grew louder as the week rolled on. But even this back-and-forth over naming the camps has been a recurrent feature in the mass detention of civilians ever since its inception, a history that long predates the Holocaust.
At the heart of such policy is a question: What does a country owe desperate people whom it does not consider to be its citizens? The twentieth century posed this question to the world just as the shadow of global conflict threatened for the second time in less than three decades. After the harrowing toll of the Holocaust with the murder of millions, the world revisited its answer, deciding that perhaps something was owed to those in mortal danger. From the Fourth Geneva Convention protecting civilians in to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the international community established humanitarian obligations toward the most vulnerable that apply, at least in theory, to all nations.
The twenty-first century is unraveling that response. Countries are rejecting existing obligations and meeting asylum seekers with walls and fences, from detainees fleeing persecution who were sent by Australia to third-party detention in the brutal offshore camps of Manus and Nauru to razor-wire barriers blocking Syrian refugees from entering Hungary. While some nations, such as Germany, wrestle with how to integrate refugees into their labor force—more and more have become resistant to letting them in at all.
The latest location of this unwinding is along the southern border of the United States. So far, American citizens have gotten only glimpses of the conditions in the border camps that have been opened in their name. In the month of May, Customs and Border Protection reported a total of , migrants who were apprehended or turned themselves in between ports of entry along the southwest border, an increase of 34 percent from April alone.
Upon apprehension, these migrants are temporarily detained by Border Patrol, and once their claims are processed, they are either released or handed over to ICE for longer-term detention. In total, HHS reports that it is currently holding some 12, minors. Current law limits detention of minors to twenty days, though Senator Lindsey Graham has proposed expanding the court-ordered limit to days. Since the post is on federal land, it will be exempt from state child welfare inspections. In addition to the total of detainees held by Border Patrol, an even higher number is detained at centers around the country by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency: on a typical day at the beginning of this month, ICE was detaining more than 52, migrants.
The family separation policy outraged the public in the , but despite legal challenges, it never fully ended. Less publicized have been the deaths of twenty-four adults in ICE custody since the beginning of the Trump administration; in addition, six children between the ages of two and sixteen have died in federal custody over the last several months.
Conditions for detainees have not been improving. At the end of May, a Department of Homeland Security inspector general found nearly migrants at a Texas shelter built for a capacity of people. Those detainees reported sitting outside for weeks in temperatures that soared above degrees. He was covered in bruises. Mass detention without trial earned a new name and a specific identity at the end of the nineteenth century. Other kinds of group detention had appeared much earlier in North American history.
The US government drove Native Americans from their homelands into prescribed exile, with death and detention in transit camps along the way. Some Spanish mission systems in the Americas had accomplished similar ends by seizing land and pressing indigenous people into forced labor.
During the years when slavery was legal in the US, detention was one of its essential features. Exile, theft, and forced labor can come later, but in the beginning, detention itself is usually the point of concentration camps. By the end of the nineteenth century, the mass production of barbed wire and machines guns made this kind of detention possible and practical in ways it never had been before. After women and children began dying in vast numbers behind barbed wire because there had been little planning for shelter and even less for food, US President William McKinley made his call to war before Congress.
After a grim, week-long fight, the Marines took the hill. It became a naval base, and the United States has never left that patch of land. As part of the larger victory, the US inherited the Philippines. Following a massacre of American troops at Balangiga in September , during the third year of the conflict, the US established its own concentration camp system.
Meanwhile, in southern Africa in , the British had opened their own camps during their battle with descendants of Dutch settlers in the second Boer War. British soldiers filled tent cities with Boer women and children, and the military authorities called them refugee camps. They are not refugee camps. They are camps of concentration. International peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected countries, including the DRC, typically prioritize top-down approaches. This conference brought together experts of West Africa and the Sahel specifically to shed light on the implications of elections, radicalization, and rising threats from jihadi militants and other armed conflict actors.
This tripartite political phenomenon has significant consequences for governance and security in the region and beyond. The conference addressed the practice and significance of multiparty elections in contexts of competitive authoritarian regimes, post-intervention transitions, and governance reforms — particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Senegal. It also assessed logics of radicalization, consequences for security strategies, and logics of military engagement both for state actors and international forces.
Finally, it assessed the distinct threats arising from Jihadi groups in the region, state militarization, and migrant trajectories. This article argues for an integrated, political and pragmatic approach to justice and security development as one of the key objectives of effective international support to peace building and state building in conflict-affected and fragile states. Developments since the s suggest that different actors and communities have started to work on the same issues from different angles and with — perceived— different mandates.
As a result, important parts of the debate on how to deal with security system reform SSR , justice reform and the rule of law seem somewhat stuck in conceptual arguments. This article suggests moving away from such debates and instead to focus on what such justice and security engagements are meant to achieve, for whom, and which general approaches are likely to provide most added value.
A report commissioned by the EU on community justice in Burundi, including an analysis of traditional justice mechanisms. The improper management of conventional ammunition and explosives poses significant safety and security risks. Frequent ammunition depot explosions and diversions from ammunition stocks of state actors testify to the relevance of the issue to Africa.
Overcoming challenges to effective national ammunition management can be a formidable task in itself. This paper considers the challenges to and scope for action on ammunition management in Africa. It is argued that concerted efforts by African states and their international partners will be essential to effectively limiting risks of undesirable explosive events and ammunition diversions on the continent. The fight against illegal arms transfers requires regulation and an effective monitoring of arms brokers. Their business primarily consists of facilitating and arranging transactions in exchange for compensation or material recompense.
Indeed some of them manage to circumvent existing controls by exploiting different national regulations or conducting their activities from countries where controls are weak or non-existent. In the EU member states took an important initiative by setting a harmonized system of control of arms brokers. With the adoption of a European Common Position they introduced controls on brokering activities taking place on their territories. Yet, six years later, all EU member states still have no legislation on arms brokering, while others need to adapt their national legislation to EU standards.
Furthermore this European instrument reflects minimum standards which currently appear insufficient to effectively fight against ill disposed brokers. This report reviews the extent to which EU member states implement the Common Position on arms brokering and suggests some improvements for a better control on brokering activities and an effective fight against illegal arms transfers. One section of the report also considers a major gap in the national regulations: extraterritorial controls on brokering activities.
Finally, the report presents the case study of the Belgian legislation on arms brokering. The problem of lacking or inconsistent regulations on arms brokering is painstakingly clear. Arms brokers are central in many illicit arms transfers, including transfers to conflict regions, embargoed actors, and serious human rights abusers. This report reviews progress made around the control of brokering. It shows that a growing number of states have established legislation on arms brokering, or will do so. Comparing domestic norms and multilateral standards reveals that there is a large degree of convergence on key regulatory principles and measures, a good foundation for developing global minimal standards on brokering controls.
Further efforts in this regard remain crucial, in particular in order to eliminate the loopholes and inconsistencies which allow brokering activities to take place with relative ease and impunity. It is therefore urgent that the UN establish, at a minimum, a Group of Governmental Experts GGE on Brokering, mandated to consider the feasibility of an international instrument and to identify the elements required for effective national brokering controls.
The mandate should also consider controls on transportation and financial services related to arms brokering. Complementary standards on SALW control should also be developed in conformity with commitments undertaken with the UN PoA, including the development of minimal standards on end-user certificates and of adequate licensing to decide on arms exports and brokering activities. This paper will proceed in four parts.
The first part will examine the basic theoretical relationship between legal systems and market-oriented poverty reduction. The second part will examine various elements of legal and judicial reform and current activities. The third part will describe a strategy framework and methodology for designing and preparing legal and judicial activities.
Lastly, the fourth part will examine the role of the World Bank and the organizational mechanisms available to the Bank to ensure that its theoretical and policy approaches are constantly refined for new circumstances and in light of new interdisciplinary research.
For over a decade, the international community has been helping developing nations reform their judiciaries. At the same time, the United Nations Development Program, the European Union and its member states, and the American, Australian, Canadian, and Japanese governments have provided significant grant aid to help developing nations improve the operation of the judicial branch of government. Why are international donors supporting reform? What kinds of projects are included within a reform program? How can a successful reform be achieved?
This is important, in turn, in order to clarify the contributions that transitional justice can make to security and development, particularly in the context of fragility. Contrary to misconceptions, particularly on the part of non-experts, transitional justice is neither past-oriented, nor of concern to victims alone; rather, to the extent that it achieves any of its goals, it does so in virtue of its potential to affirm general but basic norms—therein its potential contributions to both security and development.
Those who work in the legal reform business generally expected greater impact from this investment in new laws. Analysts, drafters, and project implementers often assumed that market forces would propel a greater level of implementation once the right laws were in place. Instead, a number of common problems repeatedly appear as counterparts in beneficiary countries have moved from legislation to implementation.
These problems have been independently identified by numerous legal reform professionals. When the law works for everyone, it defines and enforces the rights and obligations of all. This allows people to interact with one another in an atmosphere that is certain and predictable. Thus, the rule of law is not a mere adornment to development; it is a vital source of progress. It creates an environment in which the full spectrum of human creativity can flourish, and prosperity can be built.
The Commission understands legal empowerment to be a process of systemic change through which the poor and excluded become able to use the law, the legal system, and legal services to protect and advance their rights and interests as citizens and economic actors. African knowledge and experience has contributed much to theevolution of the security sector reform SSR concept while Africa continuesto be the main arena for SSR programmes. Consequently, over the years,DCAF has actively sought to expand its knowledge base, policy researchfocus and operational activities on African security sector reform andgovernance issues.
For these reasons it is therefore particularly appropriatethat DCAF focuses on this subject in — the 10th anniversary of thecreation of the DCAF foundation. The working groups consisted of a core of between fi ve and seven experts and stakeholders in their individual capacities from around the world, with leading edge expertise and experience in the theme to be studied. For nearly two decades, international organisations and bilateral donors agencies have been involved in the promotion and implementation of legal and judicial reform projects in developing and transition countries.
This paper refers to this process as the rule of law enterprise RLE. It identifies the ambiguities and misconceptions of the RLE and asks why there has been so little interaction between those involved in the implementation of legal and judicial reform and academics with knowledge and experience on this topic. After identifying the theoretical and practical obstacles to a fruitful dialogue the paper concludes that such a dialogue could take place, provided that academics — political scientists and lawyers — and practitioners adjust their respective approaches.
Researchers contest its substance while those most responsible for its implementation e. At its worst, this means that competing reform activities undermine each other, making long term success less likely. The questions we address are about the deficiencies in how rule of law is conceived. Particular attention is paid to the little recognised assumption that the Weberian state ideal corresponds to the societies on the receiving end of international interventions.
We argue that the optimum sources for immediate yet sustainable rule of law solutions may often be those which bear little resemblance to the conventional state-based providers that populate mainstream conceptions. In this paper, I will analyze the connections between the multilateral debates and external agendas, on the one hand, and the implementation of rule of law strategies in the field, on the other.
The first part of the paper will start with a brief historical overview of the emergence of international support for rule of law institutions and its progressive inclusion into conflict management strategies. Postconflict societies are characterized by lack of the rule of law, past and present gross human rights violations, impunity, and economic devastation and decay.
In response to past human rights violations, a variety of measures have been developed, including prosecutions at both international and domestic levels, truth commissions, and reparations for victims. All these options need strong institutions. In postconflict and post-authoritarian societies, this often requires reforming or rebuilding the judicial system and its supporting services. This paper draws connections between judicial reform, transitional justice, and development in transitional contexts.
The linkages between good governance, rule of law and economic growth, once more fully understood, have the potential to unshackle economies and decrease poverty throughout the developing world. Currently, however, most initiatives are heavy in rhetoric and light on directly addressing the legal structures and policies that affect the poor. Until developing countries can enable their vast populations of poor citizens to actively participate in their economies, their growth and the creation of egalitarian societies will be severely hampered.
Analyzing and building on the final report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and other previous work, this article outlines a functional approach to addressing the most critical needs of the poor, including but not limited to issues that directly affect livelihoods and economic opportunity.
It accordingly aims to help the poor gain a foothold in effecting their own development and making legal empowerment a reality. By introducing important lessons in ommunity-based justice from an access to justice program in Bolivia, the article provides tangible examples that might help shape legal empowerment initiatives to best address the needs of the poor.
This study provides groundbreaking analysis of the challenges faced in security and justice service delivery. More importantly, it proposes an innovative solution for development agencies engaging in supporting security and justice development. A multi-layered approach to security and justice programmes is a methodology that is highly context specific, targeting donor assistance to those providers — state and non-state actors simultaneously — at the multiple points where actual day-to-day service delivery occurs.
A multi-layered strategy recognises that unorthodox solutions and partnerships may be necessary to respond to the severe challenges of fragile states. The primary objective is to develop and strengthen the relationship between service providers state and non-state and the users of those services in the marketplaces where they work, in the neighbourhoods where they live and on the roads they travel, while fostering greater performance accountability. The final chapter, Part III, contains recommendations for the justice sector of Mongolia and for future donors.
As its final contribution to its Mongolian partners, this Report seeks to synthesize the consensus outcomes of the conference which in turn were intended to serve as a road map for future reforms and improvements in the administration of justice. This speech, delivered by Amartya Sen at the first World Bank conference on Comprehensive Legal and Judicial Development, discusses the importance of legal reform within a comprehensive development framework. Legal reform advances freedom-a crucial and constitutive quality of comprehensive development. Legal reform is thus important on its own; its cause need not be indirectly established through its contribution to economic development.
Legal reform is, however, also causally interconnected with other constitutive elements of comprehensive development. By acting as a platform where the poor have equal voice and by creating the backbone of the capitalist system, a sound legal system is necessary to advance political and economic development. Those of us that have had the privilege to live and work in Pakistan have had much to appreciate. This aim of this paper is to illuminate and reflects on one focused and substantial effort to improve this situation.
It complements an earlier article outlining the purpose, goals and objectives of the project published at its outset. The paper approaches the subject in four parts: history, objectives, progress to date, and lessons learned. Like other donors, SDC has dealt with rule of law issues for years. In several countries, SDC supports judicial reform and the improvement of the legal framework for economic and social development.
The concept paper begins by identifying the essential elements of the rule of law. Although there is no internationally accepted definition of the rule of law, key elements generally include: non-discrimination and equality before the law, the hierarchy of norms, and the substantive coherence of the legal framework, the government is bound by law, the separation of powers, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and respect for human rights.
The rule of law is interlinked with other concepts used in international cooperation: the rule of law is a means to realize human rights and gender equality, a key element for good governance, decentralization, poverty reduction, economic development, and peace building. Depending on these different perspectives, the concept is multicoloured, and it results in different and sometimes even conflicting approaches to and priorities for legal and judicial reforms. SDC will use the rule of law concept as a means to realize human rights, and implement its principles with flexibility, taking into account the relevant context, and potential entry points for cooperation.
Part two of this concept paper looks at the growing trend to include the rule of law dimension in legal and judicial reform projects. The performance of judicial institutions depends not just on operational efficiency, but also on their accessibility to vulnerable groups and effectiveness in realizing human rights. Justice sector reforms are increasingly seen from a systemic perspective, as a series of interconnected institutions and procedures to be analysed and improved.
The examples show that the legal dimension of development can be addressed in a variety of contexts and manners with different partners and entry points. This paper cautions that unless there is an opening of political space and a participatory transition, the soon to be independent government risks recreating the kind of centralised, authoritarian and ultimately unstable state it finally managed to escape. Meanwhile, armed insurgencies, militia activity and army defections highlight internal fault lines and latent grievances within the security sector. More than 1. Preventing violence and building peaceful states that respond to the aspirations of their citizens requires strong leadership and concerted national and international efforts.
The Report is based on new research, case studies and extensive consultations with leaders and development practitioners throughout the world. It is now widely recognized that the advancement of the rule of law is essential to the maintenance of peace and security, the realization of sustainable development, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Rule of law assistance is a growing area of demand and significant experience has been accumulated in this field over the past 20 years.
Yet, despite the centrality of the rule of law to our challenging global agenda, rule of law assistance is still too often executed in an ad hoc manner, designed without proper consultations with national stakeholders, and absent exacting standards of evaluation. A new perspective on rule of law assistance delivery is clearly needed.
Sixteen national rule of law experts engaged in rule of law reform in 13 countries and regions, joined representatives from the United Nations system and partner countries to offer their respective views on how rule of law assistance can be better channeled to deliver results. The overall aim is to enhance dialogue between rule of law assistance providers and rule of law reformers in countries with a view to placing national perspectives at the centre of rule of law assistance. This report outlines the following set of recommendations, corresponding to four major common conclusions which emerged from the consultative process.
The national experts widely agreed that rule of law assistance is enhanced where: 1 national actors experience greater ownership over rule of law programmes; 2 local stakeholders are empowered; 3 assistance is coordinated and coherent; and 4 meaningful evaluations and assessment of impact are conducted. These common conclusions are based on the personal views and experiences of the national experts with rule of law assistance as articulated in the Voices section of this report.
It is hoped that the common conclusions and recommendations formulated by this informal forum of experts will serve as an important turning point towards a more effective approach to rule of law assistance. A clear call emerged for national rule of law policy-makers and experts and donor partners to come together to develop an internationally-recognized framework guiding rule of law assistance.
They will hopefully be of use to policymakers, practitioners and programme managers working in and on conflict-affected environments. The complexity of the challenges in stabilisation environments require integrated solutions at multiple levels. Rather than re-inventing our responses to each new crisis, we need to identify relevant lessons from past experience, learn from these, and adapt them to the specific requirements of each new environment. The identification of lessons remains just the first step. This requires a genuine commitment at all levels to learning from the past, the dedication of resources human and financial to support the learning process, and the development of systems to feed lessons back into policy, planning and practice.
The lessons learning process should be a continuous cycle. This Issues Note gives readers a basic understanding of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DDR , so that they are in a position to consider whether DDR is an appropriate stabilisation intervention. It clarifies questions, issues and articulates the decisions that the practitioner may face with when considering a DDR programme. Human rights are key to stabilisation - both as a means and as an end in themselves. Although we need to promote universal adherence to human rights, we need to recognise that there can be different cultural and political approaches to dealing with human rights violations, especially during a fragile peace process.
Human rights need to be embedded in planning and assessment for stabilisation; the selection of specific tools will depend on needs, opportunities and constraints in any particular context. This report is based on a February 25, panel presentation and the views expressed on fighting corruption in SSR during a meeting of the Security Sector Reform Working Group. This study is a comparative analysis of active, DDR programmes, whether they were in the early planning phase or implementing final social reintegration activities. Specifically, this report aims to address academics and practitioners.
The conference sought to dispel the notion that there is no connection between disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration DDR and security sector reform SSR. The conference determined that, in reality, DDR and SSR are interrelated and mutually reinforcing and should occur simultaneously in a holistic manner. Justice Beyond The Hague provides important insights into the strengths and limitations of current international justice mechanisms.
It makes a clear case for increasing support to national legal systems and outlines a variety of ways that the U. While there will always be a place for international courts in countries that cannot or will not prosecute perpetrators themselves, this Council Special Report successfully argues that domestic systems can and should play a more meaningful role.
Posted with permission. In parallel, the demand for SSR and rule of law advisors who combine specialist knowledge with a solid understanding of the politics involved in reform processes has increased. At present, many bilateral and multilateral donors face serious capacity gaps when it comes to having readily-available and deployable personnel with SSR experience and expertise. Security and justice reform requires a multi-disciplinary response: it requires personnel with an understanding of the political nature of SSR and the importance of accountability to a legitimate authority, coupled with those who have a technical understanding of how, for example, a police service, the military, the courts system and the various ministries function.
This study analyses the issue of early recovery. In doing so it critically discusses, in a first step, the policy strategies and operational frameworks of selected bilateral donors, regional organizations as well as multilateral institutions to disentangle the main background concepts underlying the policy concepts and to inform the reader of the major challenges involved. The research investigate the following issues: the relations and trade-offs between the strategic objectives of peace-building as well as security and development; the analytical integration of socio-economic development and conflict; the methodological conceptualization of the 'transition' phase; the trade-offs between short and long-term development objectives; and the challenge of sequence and prioritization.
The study highlights policy recommendations and implications in fourteen priority areas: the reintegration of ex-combatants and special groups IDPs, refugees , infrastructure, employment, agriculture, education, health, fiscal policy and public finance, monetary policy and exchange rate management, the financial sector, external finances capital flight, debt relief, remittances, ODA , trade, private sector development and entrepreneurship, economic governance land property rights and access to land, corruption, the management of natural resources, illegal economic activities, regional conflict factors and horizontal inequality.
Member States have launched thirteen SSR missions without mustering the political will to supply sufficient adequately-trained personnel, money and equipment. Member States must decide on whether or not they want the EU to become a viable international actor in the field of SSR. If so, they must clearly prioritise future CSDP missions in order not to waste scarce resources through mere flag raising exercises. Therefore, and in addition to addressing the operational needs mentioned above, the EU needs to agree on an SSR strategy in the EAS which would clarify the concrete criteria for intervention as well as objectives to be achieved in the framework of SSR-related CSDP missions.
The loss by many states of the monopoly of the legitimate use of force has contributed significantly to the proliferation of failed and failing states worldwide. In such states, a multitude of threats, including insurgencies, terrorist networks, transnational organized crime, and illicit shadow economies, flourish. These states often become trapped in cycles of violent conflict that threaten stability and security at home, in their neighborhoods, and throughout the world. States emerging from conflict are highly prone to return to conflict within the first few years of postconflict status.
The widespread availability of lethal weapons exacerbates the tensions that already permeate conflict and postconflict environments. The mechanism of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration DDR is widely acknowledged to be an essential component of successful peacekeeping, peace-building, postconflict management, and state-building.
Security sector reform SSR has emerged as a promising though poorly understood tool for consolidating stability and establishing sovereignty after conflict. While DDR enables a state to recover the monopoly or at least the preponderance of force, SSR provides the opportunity for the state to establish the legitimacy of that monopoly. Despite the considerable experience acquired by the international community, the critical interrelationship between DDR and SSR and the ability to use these mechanisms with consistent success remain less than optimally developed.
DDR and SSR are essential tools of modern statecraft, but their successful use is contingent upon our understanding of both the affinities and the tensions between them. These essays aim to excite further thought on how these two processes—DDR and SSR—can be implemented effectively and complimentarily to better accomplish the shared goals of viable states and enduring peace.
The research project The North Caucasus: views from within focuses on issues of social difference, such as ethnicity, religion, generational difference and migration, and the challenges arising from these. It considers local perspectives on these challenges; how people seek to address them; and what they consider needs to be done to resolve them.
L’offensive anti-Daesh sur la ville symbole de Dabiq est imminente
It involved the collaboration of international and Russian experts, including researchers from the North Caucasus, and institutional partnership between the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Saferworld. Our research shows that social and political conditions for people on the ground — particularly for youth, who feel excluded from both economic and political life — do little to defend society against the influence of ideological extremism.
More engagement with the problems affecting young people, and improved governance, including in the security and justice sectors, can help build resilience to violence. In addition to the main report, five case studies from the individual republics will shortly be uploaded to the Saferworld website. The Russian version is titled The North Caucasus: views from within - Challenges and problems for social and political development. The five republic case studies are included within the report.
The project provides European Union institutions with analysis and recommendations based on the opinions and experiences of local people in a range of countries and regions affected by fragility and violent conflict. Read the policy brief. Find out more about the People's Peacemaking Perspectives project. The importance of security sector reform SSR has increasingly been emphasizedin international engagement with post-conflict countries.
Abd el-Razzâq el-Sanhourî
Women are acknowledged as playing important roles in peacebuilding and in sustaining security on a communal level. Gender inequality is understood to inhibit development and violence against women to be a pervasive form of insecurity with widespread ill-effects across society. There is also growing awareness of the need to address the particular experiences of men and boys, both as victims and as sources of insecurity. Gender and security sector reform 2. Gender and specifi c post-conflict security sector reform issues 5.
For the purpose of this paper the term "child soldier" will be used for a personunder the age of 18 who is associated with armed groups or government forces, in any capacity other than a family member. The term "child combatant" will be used for a person under the age of 18 who is or has been actively participating in hostilities in such a manner that he or she adheres to the criteria set in international humanitarian law.
Currently scores of children are recruited and used for military purposes, and perpetrators are not held accountable. There is clearly a need to move from lawmaking, program development, and training, to law enforcement, implementation, monitoring and reporting. In the words of the UN Secretary-General: to move to an "era of application". This project aimed to complement existing information on gender and SSR issues in Liberia and to reinforce information-sharing and coordination between actors.
In addition to validating the findings of the study, the participants made key recommendations related to gender and training, policy development, programmes and activities. The report was launched in Monrovia on 23 September This working paper suggests the best practices in reintegration program design include: planning of pilot activities for reintegration support at the start of the DDR process; investing in regular communication and outreach with ex-combatants, communities and other stakeholders; ensuring specialised services and program adaptations for vulnerable groups of ex-combatants including children, women and the disabled; and building broad-based partnerships that facilitate the evolution of reintegration activities into wider development programming.
As evidenced by the successes and challenges of reintegration programs around the world, the institutional structures and arrangements governing DDR and reintegration programs can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of these operations. Minimum institutional features of particular relevance include: strong national ownership; the separation of political oversight and technical implementation bodies; decentralized program structures; timely and regular monitoring and evaluation; rigorous financial systems and controls; and a clear exit strategy.
To access the full paper, click here. This discussion note draws on a variety of studies, in particular the work produced for the seminar series on reintegration sustainability in the context of shadow economies that TDRP organised. To access full text, click here. This paper, commissioned by Sida to the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, aims both to improve knowledge regarding reintegration and to identify the role of development co-operation in this process. By looking at certain factors in a society; physical security, economic security, political influence and social reintegration of ex-combatants, this study sets out to understand circumstances that are essential to reintegration, and what culprits to avoid.
In particular, it recommends certain precautions, steps and strategies that donors and their partners need to take into consideration when promoting reintegration through development cooperation. Rule of law—based criminal justice responses to terrorism are most effectively ensured when they are practiced within a criminal justice system capable of handling ordinary criminal offenses while protecting the rights of the accused and when all are equally accountable under the law. Building the capacity of weak criminal justice systems to safeguard mutual rights and responsibilities of governments and their citizens is essential for the alleviation of a number of conditions conducive to violent extremism and the spread of terrorism.
A new wave of multilateral counterterrorism initiatives has the opportunity to recalibrate how criminal justice and rule of law—oriented counterterrorism capacity-building assistance is delivered to developing states with weak institutions. This policy brief argues that aligning counterterrorism capacity-building agendas within a framework informed by the Paris Principles and the development cooperation experience could greatly enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of criminal justice and rule of law capacity-building assistance in general and in preventing terrorism specifically.
This paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of constitutional choices made after conflict, drawing upon comparative studies of six constitutions and peace agreements. The paper attempts to synthesize the practical lessons drawn from the cases, with a focus on i the constitution-making process; ii the extent of reliance on executive and geographical power-sharing; iii the viability of checks and balances; iv the electoral model; v the role of political parties in the transition; and vi issues of implementation.
To view this publication, please follow this link. This Index provides governments and citizens with information on how their defence ministries and armed forces compare to others in tackling defence corruption. It measures the degree of corruption risk and vulnerability in government defence establishments — the defence ministry, the armed forces, and other government institutions in that country such as auditing institutions that may influence levels of corruption risk in the sector.
It forms a basis for reform for concerned governments, and serves as a tool to identify where to concentrate efforts. The needs assessment is built on desk research, interviews, and a series of local stakeholder consultations conducted in Novi Sad, Kragujevac, Novi Pazar, Bujanovac and Belgrade in the course of March and April They are based on international including regional and national law, standards, good practices, and the writings of experts.
They address national security—rather than all grounds for withholding information. Population report Population report Population report Subscribe to Population. Contact us. Subscribe to the e-alert.